We analyze the effects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to inefficiently high prices for spare parts. Furthermore, monopolization induces the manufacturers to choose inefficiently high qualities. The key for these results is the observation that high prices for spare parts entail a negative external effect inasmuch as liability obligations imply that consumers of competing products have to pay the high prices as well.
Introduction
The optimal extent of design protection has been extensively discussed during the past few years. This is especially true for the protection of spare parts for motor vehicles.`Must-match' restrictions with respect to the exact look of visible spare parts in combination with strict design protection imply that car manufacturers and their component suppliers have almost perfect monopoly power for visible replacement parts. Concerning the economic effects of this observation, there are essentially two different views. First, monopoly power due to design protection should be evaluated in the same manner as patent protection for innovations. Furthermore, applying the Chicago school argument that there is only one monopoly rent leads to the conclusion that monopoly power on secondary markets is not detrimental for social welfare. 1 According to the second view, however, this conclusion is premature. Monopoly power on secondary markets may well lead to additional distortions and may thus increase allocative inef ciencies.
The actual policy in the European Union seems to follow the second line of reasoning. Based on the Design Directive of 1998 (Directive 98/71/EC) and the proposal for the amendment on that Directive of September 2004 (COM, 2004, 582 nal) , the parliament of the European Union in December 2007 backed a proposed directive which aims at liberalizing secondary markets for spare parts. The proposed directive limits design protection for visible parts to primary markets by referring to a`repair clause'. This clause allows competitive suppliers to produce spare parts for secondary markets, i.e., markets for repair and maintenance services. Thus, design protection is to be reduced such that market entry and competition on secondary markets is possible.
The model presented in this paper supports the approach taken by the European Union. The focus of our model is on the possibility that consumers-car drivers-cause accidents with other cars and that they are responsible for the entailed damage. The analysis of the implied economic effects shows that car manufacturers have in fact strong incentives to monopolize the markets for their spare parts as this can lead to higher pro ts. Social welfare, however, is lower with monopolized markets.
The key for these results is the observation that high prices for spare parts not only harm a manufacturer's own consumers, but also entail a negative external effect for other consumers. With strictly positive probabilities of causing accidents, high prices for spare parts increase expected expenditures for all consumers. Using this correlation, each manufacturer has an incentive to choose rather high prices for spare parts but relatively low prices for cars. In contrast to the simple Chicago school argument, monopolized markets for spare parts are thus not neutral with respect to the market equilibrium. Furthermore, considering endogenous quality decisions, monopolized markets for spare parts alter the decisions of the rms such that they choose socially-inef cient high qualities. High prices for spare parts and inef ciently-high qualities imply that social welfare is unambiguously lower with monopolized markets for spare parts as compared to the case with competitive markets for spare parts.
In contrast to the majority of the literature on secondary markets (see Chen et al., 1998 , for an overview), our results are based on external effects. While we assume that consumers are locked in with respect to the possible choices of spare parts, we also assume that consumers have perfect foresight and that there are no commitment problems concerning future prices. More precisely, we analyze a simple three-stage game where two car producing rms choose the qualities of their cars rst. In the second stage, the rms decide on their prices for cars and spare parts. Consumers decide in the third stage which car to buy. Their decisions are based on the (given) prices and the overall expenditures they expect to incur if they buy a car from either rm. Expected expenditures comprise the price for the car bought as well as expected payments due to accidents. While each consumer can decide whether or not to repair his own car, every consumer has to pay the damages he caused to other cars. Assuming rational consumers, we suppose that consumer can perfectly anticipate the expected payments due to accidents caused. This assumption can be justi ed by two observations. First, the expected costs for repairing other cars can be thought as being entailed in the premiums for liability insurance car drivers are obliged to carry in most countries. 2 Second, at least in Germany costs for repair and maintenance services are rather well documented. For example, the largest German association of car drivers regularly publishes detailed cost indexes which comprise the cars' prices, average costs for fuel consumption as well as expected costs for repair and maintenance services. 3 Our setting does not entail any aspect of price discrimination between consumers who differ with respect to their willingness to pay (see for example Chen et al., 1993, and Emch, 2003) . Furthermore, with perfect foresight of consumers manufacturers cannot economize on lock-in effects or information costs (see Borenstein et al., 1995) . 4 Our assumption that all prices are chosen in the second stage rules out any commitment problem. Borenstein et al. (2000) analyze an overlappinggeneration model with durable goods and service provisions. They show that even with competitive markets for durable goods, rms will charge prices above marginal costs for services if they cannot commit to future prices (see also Blair and Herndorn, 1996) . Additionally, we assume that there is no imperfect information with respect to the manufacturers' qualities. This is in contrast to Schwarz and Werden (1996) who show that tying of goods and services in combination with low prices for services can be used to signal high qualities.
Our results concerning social welfare are contrary to the ndings of Carlton and Waldman (2006) . Their approach focuses on durable goods in conjunction with maintenance, remanufactured parts and product improvements. Carlton and Waldman show that in all these cases monopolization of the respective aftermarkets can enhance ef ciency. In contrast to competitive markets, monopolization allows for pricing structures that resemble Ramsey prices and thus lead to more ef cient allocations when maintenance versus replacement decisions or the purchase of either improved or upgraded products are analyzed. In the case of remanufactured parts, competition may harm social welfare because of potential cost disadvantages of competing suppliers. Compared to the model analyzed by Carlton and Waldman our model focuses on the impact of liability obligations and shows that the induced strategic incentives for the rms lead to negative welfare effects of monopolized markets for spare parts.
In the following, we rst describe the model. We then characterize consumers' decisions and specify the rms' demand functions for cars and spare parts. Section 4 focuses on the benchmark case where spare parts are offered competitively. In section 5, we turn to the market outcome when spare parts are offered by the car producing rms only. Using speci c functional forms, we illustrate our results in section 6, where we also consider social welfare. The nal section concludes.
The Model
We focus on the impact that potential accidents and liability obligations have on the rms' prices for cars and spare parts. Our model is based on the following framework: There are two rms which produce cars and spare parts. Spare parts are only used to repair damages due to accidents consumers may cause. Consumers are differentiated according to the Hotelling model and can decide which car to buy. Furthermore, consumers can decide whether or not they repair their own cars when they have caused an accident. Liability obligations, however, imply that consumers are obliged to adjust any damage they have caused to other cars.
Firms The two rms i = 1;2 are located at the endpoints of the unit interval, i.e., at 0 and 1, respectively. Both rms produce cars and spare parts. For simplicity we assume that each rm produces just one spare part. Both rms decide on the quality q i of their cars and set prices p i and e p i for their cars and their spare parts, respectively. The rms have the same marginal costs functions C(q) and e C(q) for producing cars and spare parts. For simplicity we assume C(q) > C(q); C 0 (q);C 00 (q) > 0 and e e C 0 (q);C 00 (q) > 0: e Consumers Consumers are characterized by their location θ 2 [0;1] on the unit interval. Locations are uniformly distributed, and the number of consumers is normalized to one. Consumers have a quasi-linear utility function and incur linear transportation costs. We assume that the market for cars is covered, i.e., each consumer buys exactly one car. Consumers' decisions which car to buy depend on the expected quality of the cars, expected overall expenditures, and on the consumers' locations (expected quality and expenditures will be characterized in the next section). Let the expected quality of car i be denoted by q e i and let m e i denote the expected overall expenditures associated with a purchase of car i. Then, the expected utility of a consumer located at θ if he buys car i is given by (1)
Accidents Each consumer who buys a car of either type can cause two different types of accidents. First, he can cause accidents involving other cars. Second, there are one-car accidents. We assume that all consumers have the same probabilities to cause accidents of the different types. For simplicity, we normalize the overall probability that a consumer causes an accident to one. The probability that a consumer causes an accident with another car is denoted by ρ 2 [0;1] whereas 1 ρ denotes the probability that he causes an accident where no other car is involved. 5 Considering damages, we assume that accidents differ with respect to the severity of the implied damages. More precisely, we assume that the severity s 2 [0;1] of any accident is randomly determined and that the damage D an accident of sever-5 Denoting the overall probability that a consumer causes an accident by γ and assuming 0 < γ < 1, the probability that a consumer causes an accident of either type could be written as γρ and γ(1 ρ), respectively. However, employing γ < 1, we would get qualitatively the same results. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that s is uniformly distributed on [0;1] and that all accidents are independent events. Additionally, we assume that any damage can only be xed by using the spare part for the respective car. 7 Given this framework, we analyze the following three-stage game, which we solve by backward induction. In the rst stage of the game, both rms choose the quality of their cars. Prices for cars and spare parts are set in the second stage. In the nal stage of the game, consumers decide which car to buy. Furthermore, potential accidents and the involved demand for spare parts are realized.
Consumers' Demand for Cars and Spare Parts
In order to characterize consumers' demand for cars and spare parts, we start by analyzing the consumers' expected costs for repairing their own cars as well as the expected quality of their cars. We then turn to the costs consumers expect to bear due to their obligations to repair all damages they cause to other cars. Combining the results from both steps and using (1), we are able to characterize the demand functions for cars and spare parts.
Assume that a consumer bought car i and has caused an accident of severity s. Then, the consumer will repair his car whenever p i p i and e
hold. While e p i p i ensures that the consumer does not buy a new car instead of repairing his old car, (4) can be used to de ne a critical severity level
up to which a consumer would not repair his car. Employing S, we get the following two expressions for the the consumer's expected costs e M e i for repairing his car and for the expected quality Q e i of his car M e i ( e e p i ;
Note that (7) rests on the assumption that consumers are liable for all damages they cause to other cars. Any damage to a consumer's car which is caused by another consumer will be repaired and does not affect the quality the consumer expects if he buys car i. 8 While a consumer's expected costs for repairing his own car depend on his decision which car to buy, his expected costs e M e for repairing the damages he may cause to all other cars are given by (again, we assume e p i p i for i = 1;2)
where α i denotes the market share of rm i in the market for cars. Since liability obligations imply that any damage caused to other cars has to be repaired, M e does e not depend on whether a consumer bought his car from rm 1 or rm 2. 9 Moreover, note that e p i > p i would induce consumers who are liable for the repair of car i to buy a new car i instead of repairing the damaged car.
Combining (6)- (8) and using (1), the expected utility Eu i of consumer θ if he buys car i is given by
Solving (9) for the consumer Θ who is indifferent between buying from rm 1 and 2, we get
Employing (10), the rms' demand functions for cars X i and for spare parts e X i can be written as (the functions X i and e X i depend on all prices and qualities)
8 Strictly speaking, this result relies on the assumption that consumers can not use side payments in order to avoid inef cient repair services.
9 Note that this result heavily rests on the assumption that all consumers have the same probabilities of causing accidents of either type. Hence, there are no moral hazard or adverse selection problems as for example re ected in higher insurance rates for sports cars Note further, that our simplifying assumptions allow to extend the model by taking obligatory liability insurances into account. Assuming competitive insurance markets, the insurance premium each consumer has to pay would not depend on his decision from which rm to buy.
where X i follows from (6), the fact that with probability ρ every consumer causes e an accident where another car is involved and that consumers are liable for the damages they caused.
Benchmark: Competitive Markets for Spare Parts
Considering rst the case in which spare parts can be produced by competitive rms, we assume that the competitive rms have the same cost functions for producing spare parts as rms 1 and 2. Then, competitive markets for spare parts imply that the prices for spare parts P c i (q i ) are given by e e P c i (
The pro t functions Π c i of rms i; j = 1;2; i 6 = j can thus be written as
Maximizing Π c i with respect to p i , it is straightforward to show that the rms' equilibrium prices P c i (q i ;q j ) are implicitly given by the solution of (i = 1;2)
Furthermore, substituting P c i into the rms' pro t functions, maximizing with respect to q i , and employing the envelope theorem, the rms' optimal qualities Q c i are implicitly given by
Analyzing (16) in view of (6) and (7) shows that the optimal quality of each rm is such that it maximizes the consumers' expected quality minus the rm's costs. Hence, there are no strategic interdependencies between the rms' quality decisions. 10 Furthermore, liability obligations imply that the costs for repairing damages caused to other cars do not affect the rms' market shares. Therefore, the rms' quality decisions do not depend on ρ. However, taking into account the overall costs for repairing damages due to accidents where two cars are involved, we obtain that the socially-ef cient qualities are the lower the higher ρ. 11 Thus, the equilibrium qualities Q c i are inef ciently high as long as ρ is strictly positive.
10 This result is due to the assumption that the consumers' utility functions are quasi-linear. 11 This result follows immediately from using e p i = e C(q i ) and maximizing Q e i e M e i e M e with respect to the rms' qualities.
Monopolized Markets for Spare Parts
With spare parts exclusively sold by the rms 1 and 2, the rms' pro t functions Π i are given by
Before we analyze the price and quality equilibria implied by (17) in more detail, note rst that it is never optimal for a rmto set their prices such that e p > p holds (to simplify the exposition we drop the subscript when we refer to both rms). This result is simply due to C(q i ) > e C(q i ) and the fact that consumers always have the option to buy a new car instead of buying a spare part. Hence, we can impose p e p as a restriction the rms have to obey when they decide on their prices.
Analyzing the impact of ρ on the rms' pricing and quality decisions, it turns out that p p does not bind for either rm as long as ρ is low enough. In e contrast to the benchmark case, however, equilibrium prices and qualities are such that the difference between the prices for cars and spare parts is decreasing in ρ while the equilibrium qualities are increasing in ρ.
With relatively high values of ρ there can exist equilibria where the rms' quality decisions are asymmetric and where p e p is only binding for the rm which chooses the higher quality. Increasing ρ further, the restriction p e p becomes binding for both rms and the induced quality and pricing decisions are again symmetric.
Unconstrained Equilibria

Prices
We rst analyze the case in which p e p is not binding. Maximizing (17) with respect to p i and e p i and solving the respective rst order conditions, the rms' price reaction functions P R i and e P R i for the prices for cars and spare parts are implicitly given by the solutions of the following two equations (i; j = 1;2 and i 6 = j)
Equations (18) and (19) reveal that P R i depends on ρ and q i only. The optimal price e P R i , however, depends on the prices of rm j, the qualities of both rms as well as on ρ. Thus, we have P R i (p j ; e p j ;q i ;q j ;ρ) and e P R i (q i ;ρ). Moreover, analyzing the cross-partial derivatives of the rms' pro t functions, we get
While the rms' reaction functions P R i increase in the other rms' prices, (20) also indicates that an increase in p j has a higher positive impact on P R i than p j . Roughly e speaking, even though prices for spare parts can be used as strategic instruments, competition on the car market continues to be driven by the prices for cars. Note also, that the last inequality in (20) implies that there exists a unique price equilibrium P i (q i ;q j ;ρ) and e P i (q i ;q j ;ρ). With ρ = 0 we get e P i =C(q i ) < P i (see (19)). If there are no external e effects, i.e., if there are no accidents with other cars, the one monopoly rent argument proposed by the Chicago school applies and the equilibrium prices for the rms' spare parts are equal to the respective marginal costs. Intuitively, by choosing e P i = e C(q i ) each rm maximizes the overall surplus the rm and its consumers can get from repairing their cars. The prices for cars are then used to maximize the rms' pro ts. 12 However, analyzing the impact of ρ > 0 on P i and P i , it turns out that liabile ity obligations induce the rms to exploit the implied external effects by increasing the prices for spare parts and by decreasing the prices for cars.
Proposition 1 While ρ = 0 leads to e P i = e C(q i ) < P i , an increase in ρ increases e P i but decreases P i .
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is based on the following two observations: First, a higher probability of causing accidents where other cars are involved increases the probability that a consumer driving car j causes accidents with cars i and thus has to pay the spare part for these cars. Since the induced demand for rm i's spare parts is price inelastic, rm i has a strong incentive to increase the price for its spare parts. Second, considering the cross partial derivatives of (17) with respect to the rms' prices and using (18) and (19), we obtain
From a rm' sperspective the prices for its cars and spare parts are strategic substitutes. Since an increase in e p i leads to higher costs for repairing cars i, consumers who buy car i expect higher costs for repairing their own cars which in turn leads to a lower expected quality Q e i . To reach its optimal market share on the market for cars, rm i has thus to decrease p i if it increases e p i .
Quality
Substituting P i and e P i into the rms' pro t functions, let Π i denote the rms' reduced pro t functions
Employing the envelope theorem, and solving the rst order condition with respect to the rms' quality, the rms' quality-reaction functions Q R i are implicitly given by
(23) Inspection of (23) immediately shows that Q R i depends on ρ only. Thus, unrestricted pricing for cars and spare parts implies that the rms' quality decisions have no mutual strategic effects. Consequently, the equilibrium is symmetric and both rms choose the same equilibrium quality Q i (ρ) = Q R i (ρ). Additionally, considering the impact of ρ on Q i (ρ), we obtain Proposition 2 The equilibrium qualities Q i (ρ) are symmetric and increasing in ρ as long as D ss (s;q) is close to zero.
Compared to the case with competitive markets for spare parts, monopolized markets allow the rms to increase their prices for spare parts in order to exploit the consumers of the other rm. This observation also implies that increasing its market share by choosing higher quality is more pro table for a rmthe higher ρ. Hence, the higher the probability that consumers cause accidents with other cars, the higher are the rms' incentives to increase their quality. Compared to competitive markets for spare parts, the rms' quality are thus distorted upwards.
Propositions 1 and 2 also reveal that both rms will choose Q i (ρ) as long as ρ is close enough to zero. Furthermore, since an increase of ρ leads to higher quality, the combined effect of ρ on the rms' prices for cars is ambiguous. On the one hand a higher ρ leads to lower car prices. On the other hand higher quality increases the rms' costs and thus tend to increase the prices for their cars. Analyzing this second effect in more detail, we obtain Lemma 1 Considering q i = Q i (ρ), an increase in q i strictly decreases P i e P i if D ss and C 0 (Q i (ρ)) are high enough, i.e., if D ss is close to zero and if e 1 < (2 S( e P i ;q i ))
Proof. See Appendix. Combining Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Lemma 1, we get Corollary 1 With endogenous quality, an increase in ρ strictly decreases P i e P i if the conditions stated in Lemma 1 are satis ed.
Under the conditions stated in Lemma 1, a higher probability of causing accidents not only leads to higher quality, but it also lowers the relation between the rms' equilibrium prices for cars and spare parts. Hence, ρ being high enough may well lead to the case in which the restriction p e p is binding.
Constrained Equilibria
Analyzing the rms' pricing and quality decisions if p p is binding, we start e by characterizing the rms' pricing decisions. To capture potentially asymmetric equilibria, we distinguish the cases where p e p is binding for only one rm and where p e p is binding for both rms. It turns out that the conditions stated in Lemma 1 also imply that the rms' quality reaction functions entail an upward jump and that asymmetric equilibria may exist.
Prices
Consider rst the asymmetric case where p e p is binding for only one rm. Assuming p i = e p i and p j > e p j with i; j = 1;2; i 6 = j, the rms' pro t functions Π A i and Π A j can then be written as
Since p j > e p j does not bind by assumption, rm j's price reactions functions P RA j and e P RA j are again implicitly given by (18) and (19), i.e., we have
Solving the rst order condition for rm i's price reaction function P RA i (p j ; e p j ;q i ;q j ;ρ), we obtain that P RA i satis es (using S i := S(p i ;q i ))
Hence, P RA i is a convex combination of P R i and P R i where the relative weight of P R i e is lower given a higher ρ. Intuitively, the higher ρ, the more rm i gains from a high price for its spare parts and from distorting the price for its cars upwards in order to ensure that p i = e p i holds. For later reference let P A i and P A j ; P A j denote e the solutions of (26) and (27) and let Π A i (q i ;q j ;ρ) and Π A j (q i ;q j ;ρ) denote rm i's and rm j's reduced pro t functions.
Turning to the case with p = e p for both rms and maximizing the rms' pro t functions (i; j = 1;2;i 6 = j)
with respect to the rms' prices, it is easy to show that both rms' price reaction functions P RS i are determined by (27). We thus have
as long as p = p is binding for both rms. For later reference, let P S i denote e the solutions of the system of equations given by (28), and let Π S i (q i ;q j ;ρ) and Π S j (q i ;q j ;ρ) denote the rms' reduced pro t functions.
Quality
We again start with the asymmetric case. Assuming p i = p i and p j > e p j , analyzing e the quality decisions implied by Π A i (q i ;q j ;ρ) and Π A j (q i ;q j ;ρ) and comparing the respective rst order conditions for the rms' optimal quality, we immediately get that rm j's optimal quality decision Q RA j (ρ) is the same as in the unconstrained case, i.e., Q
While the quality decision of rm j does not change, a complete characterization of the optimal quality choice of rm i turns out to be rather involved. We thus focus on rm i's behavior when the restriction p e p starts to bind. De ning Q RA i (ρ;q j ) := arg max Π A i (q i ;q j ;ρ), we obtain Lemma 2 Assume that the conditions stated in Lemma 1 hold and that there exists a ρ A < 1 such that P i (Q R i (ρ A );q j ;ρ A ) = e P i (Q R i (ρ A );q j ;ρ A ). Then, we have
Proof. See Appendix. Whereas the rst inequality in Lemma 2 shows that rm i's optimal quality is higher when the restriction p = e p starts to bind, the second inequality reveals that a higher q i softens the restriction p e p for rm j. The intuition for these two results relies on the fact that an increase in q i leads to a higher increase in rm i's car price if p i = p i is binding (see Corollary 1). Employing (20) then shows that e the equilibrium price P A j reacts more strongly to an increase in q i as compared to the reaction of P j . Therefore, an increase in q i leads to more pro table price changes for rm i if p i = p i is binding. Additionally, ∂P A j =∂q i > 0 indicates that e asymmetric equilibria may well exist. More precisely, while rm i has an incentive to increase its quality above Q R i (ρ) for all ρ close enough to ρ A , r m j may well stick to Q R j (ρ) as the constraint p j p j is softened. 13 e Essentially the same line of reasoning applies for the symmetric case where p e p is binding for both rms. Proceeding as above and de ning Q RS j (ρ;q i ) := arg max Π S j (q j ;q i ;ρ) we get Lemma 3 Assume that the conditions stated in Lemma 1 hold and that there exists a ρ S < 1 such that P A j (Q RA j (ρ S );q i ;ρ S ) = e P A j (Q RA j (ρ S );q i ;ρ S ). Then, we have
Again, imposing p j = e p j , an increase in q j leads to a higher increase in rm j's car price as compared to the case where p j = p j does not bind. Since the rms' e prices for cars are strategic complements, the equilibrium price changes induced by an increase in q j are more pro table for rm j which also implies that rm j's incentives to choose a high quality are stronger when p j = e p j binds. 14 However, considering the quality decision of rm i, we obtain 13 Since we have Q RA i (ρ A ;q j ) > Q R i (ρ A ), continuity of the respective pro t functions of rm i implies that rm i has an incentive to choose Q RA i (ρ;q j ) for all ρ close enough to ρ A . 14 Again, Q RS j (ρ S ;q i ) > Q RA j (ρ S ) implies that rm j will choose Q RS j (ρ;q i ) for all ρ close enough to ρ S .
Lemma 4 Assume that there exists a ρ S < 1 such that P A j (Q RA j (ρ S );q i ;ρ S ) = e P A j (Q RA j (ρ S );q i ;ρ S ). Then, we have
as long as
Proof. See Appendix. In contrast to Lemma 2 and 3, Lemma 4 shows that rm i's optimal quality may be lower if p = e p starts to bind for rm j. Intuitively, since the unconstrained price e P RA j does not depend on p i and since P RS j is a convex combination of P RA j and e P RA j , an increase in p i leads to a lower increase of rm j's car price when p j = e p j binds. Hence, as long as ∂P RA i =∂q i and thus ∂P A j =∂q i are high enough, a switch from the asymmetric to the symmetric equilibrium reduces rm i's optimal quality.
Summarizing the results of Lemma 2, 3 and 4, and focusing on the rms' equilibrium qualities, we get Proposition 3 Under the conditions stated in Lemma 1, there may exist asymmetric equilibria such that the restriction p = e p is only binding for the rm that provides the higher quality. Switching from an asymmetric to a symmetric equilibrium where p = e p is binding for both rms can induce quality choices that lie in between the choices in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the above ndings we now turn to a speci c numerical example. We assume the following functional forms for the rms' cost functions and the damages caused by accidents C(q) = 
The equilibrium qualities with monopolized markets for spare parts are given by the solution of 15
as long as the restriction p = e p does not bind for either rm. Evaluating the rms' equilibrium prices shows that the difference P i (Q 1 (ρ);Q 2 (ρ);ρ) e P i (Q 1 (ρ); Q 2 (ρ);ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ. Moreover, we obtain
which indicates that asymmetric equilibria can exist. More speci cally, considering the rms' optimal quality in the asymmetric case, we assume without loss of generality that p = p binds for rm 1 only. Calculating rm 1's optimal quality in this e case and comparing the respective pro t with rm 1's pro t in the unconstrained case, we get that rm 1 is indifferent between choosing Q RA 1 (Q j (ρ);ρ) and Q 1 (ρ) for ρ 0:46:
Analyzing rm 2's optimal quality decision, it turns out that-given Q RA 1 (Q j (ρ);ρ) -rm 2 will stick to Q 2 (ρ) as long as ρ is close enough to 0:46. More precisely, we get
and that rm 2's best response to Q RA 1 (Q j (ρ);ρ) is Q 2 (ρ) for ρ 2 [0:46;0:462]. Increasing ρ above 0:462 induces rm 2 to increase its quality such that p = p e becomes binding for both rms. For ρ > 0:462 the rms' equilibrium qualities are thus given by the equilibrium qualities Q S i (ρ) in the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., by the solution of 16 q = Q RS i (q;ρ): Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium qualities and con rms the results stated in Propositions 2 and 3. Whereas the equilibrium qualities increase in ρ as long as ρ is low enough, the asymmetric equilibrium is characterized by Q RA 1 (Q 2 (ρ);ρ) > Q 2 (ρ). Increasing ρ above 0:462 induces the rms to switch in the symmetric equilibrium which is characterized by Q 2 (ρ) < Q S i (ρ) < Q RA 1 (Q 2 (ρ);ρ) as long as ρ is close enough to 0:462. Note further that Q S i (ρ) is again strictly increasing in ρ. Considering the rms' pro ts, Figure 2 reveals that both rms are better off under monopolized markets for spare parts (Π i , Π C i as well as Π A i and Π S i with 15 A more detailed formal analysis of the example is provided in the Appendix. 16 Using Q S i (ρ) and calculating the pro t of rm j when it chooses its quality such that p = e p does not bind for both rms, we get that with ρ 0:465 deviations from Q S j (ρ) are not worthwhile. 1.5 Figure 1 : Equilibrium qualities i = 1;2 denote the rms' pro ts evaluated at the equilibrium qualities). Although this relation is strict only if the constraint p = e p is binding for at least one rm, i.e., only if ρ is high enough, our results nevertheless indicate that the rms may well agree to act against any liberalization of the markets for their spare parts. 17 Note further that in the asymmetric equilibrium rm 1's pro t is lower than the pro t of rm 2. While each rm may have an incentive to increase its own quality, each rm also bene ts from the other rm's constrained pricing behavior. Figure 2 : Firms' equilibrium pro ts 17 The result Π i = Π C i relies on the speci c characteristics of the Hotelling model. With covered markets and symmetric rms, the rms' equilibrium pro ts do not depend on their costs or their prices for spare parts (see also (18)).
Finally, turning to social welfare de ned as the sum of the rms' pro ts and consumers' surplus, Figure 3 shows that social welfare is unambiguously lower with monopolized than with competitive markets for spare parts (W C (ρ) denotes social welfare with competitive markets for spare parts, while W(ρ) denotes social welfare with monopolized markets). This negative result is due to the distortions high prices for spare parts induce with respect to the consumers' decisions to repair their own cars. Moreover, compared to the case with competitive markets, monopolized markets for spare parts induce the rms to choose even more distorted quality which again lowers social welfare.
Conclusion
The results presented in the last section indicate that monopolization of markets for spare parts can be detrimental for social welfare. Positive probabilities of causing accidents together with liability obligations imply that high prices for spare parts not only harm the rms' own consumers but also the consumers of other rms. The relation between the prices for the rms' cars and their spare parts is not neutral with respect to the rms' market shares. By choosing a relatively high price for spare parts but a relatively low price for cars each rm economizes on the external effects implied by liability obligations and positive probabilities of causing accidents with other cars. Additionally, compared to competitive markets for spare parts, the rms' qualities are inef ciently high which again reduces social welfare.
Although these results are based on a rather simple model, the underlying reasoning should continue to hold under more general assumptions. Most obviously, considering the realistic case where a number of different spare parts have to be used in order to repair potential damages, the car producing rms have to be modelled as multi-product rms offering a set of different spare parts with interdependent demands. While this leads to a more complex analysis, it does not alter the conclusions with respect to the external effects implied by accidents and liability obligations. Similarly, in order to endogenize the consumers' probabilities of causing accidents, one has to extend the model by allowing for consumers' heterogeneity towards different driving behaviors as well as different car attributes like acceleration and maximum speed. Incorporating these aspects points to a comprehensive model where potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems in conjunction with strategic price setting behavior of insurance companies can be analyzed. Despite the potential merits of such a model, some of the basic relations analyzed in our model should be preserved. As long as insurance rates are based on expected damages, insurance rates are positively related to the (average) prices of spare parts. Thus, the external effects and the implied incentives of the rms to distort the relative prices for cars and spare parts continue to exist even though customized insurance rates may be based on personnel accident statistics and may differ according to the cars consumers use.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 De ning S i := S( e P i ;q i ) and using (18) and (19), simple comparative statics with respect to ρ leads to (i; j = 1;2 and i 6 = j)
∂ ∂ρ
Proof of Proposition 2 Differentiating ∂Π i ∂q i with respect to ρ and using D ss (s;q) 0, we obtain (using S i := S( e P i ;q i ))
Proof of Lemma 1 Using (18) and (19), simple comparative statics with respect to q i lead to (again, we use S i := S( e P i ;q i ))
Differentiating (38) with respect to C 0 (q i ), we get
Furthermore, re-arranging (23) leads to
for q i = Q i (ρ). Using D q > 0, we must thus have
Finally, employing D ss = 0, substituting (40) into (38) and using (41) as well as D ss = 0, we obtain
Proof of Lemma 2 Employing (26) and (27), comparative statics with respect to q i shows that ∂P A j =∂q i evaluated at q i = Q R i (ρ) and ρ = ρ A can be written as
where Φ is given by (using S i := S( e P i ;Q R i (ρ)))
(44) Furthermore, evaluating the derivative of Π A i with respect to q i and using the envelope theorem, we get "
Proof of Lemma 3 Employing (26) and (27), comparative statics with respect to q j shows that ∂P A i =∂q j evaluated at q j = Q RA j (ρ) and ρ = ρ S can be written as
where e Φ is given by (again, all functions are evaluated at q j = Q RA j (ρ) and ρ = ρ S and we use S j := S( e P A j ;Q RA j (ρ)))
Differentiating rm j's reduced pro t functions we obtain "
(50) Finally, using D ss = 0 we again have
which together with (47)-(50) leads to the result.
Proof of Lemma 4
The result is based on a comparison between "
(52) Using q j = Q RA j (ρ) and ρ = ρ S , we obtain (again, in the following all functions are evaluated at q j = Q RA j (ρ);ρ = ρ s )
Hence, we also have
Furthermore, solving
and the corresponding equations for ∂ e P A j ∂q i ; ∂P S i =∂q i and ∂P S j ∂q i we obtain 
with : ν i = 2 S j :
Finally, using D ss = 0, we also get
Substituting (57)- (63) into (55) Analysis of the Example Starting with rather low values of ρ and considering the unconstrained equilibria, the rms' price reaction functions P R i (p j ; e p j ;q i ;q j ;ρ) and e P R i (q i ;ρ) can be written as (using e c = 1=8 and c = 1=4) 
Solving (64) and (65), the equilibrium prices P i (q i ;q j ;ρ) are given by P i (q i ;q j ;ρ) = 1 6 6 + (2 + ρ(ρ 6))q i + (4c 2e c + 6ρ e c)q 2 i +e c 2 q 3 i q j (2 + ρ 2 2(c + e c)q j + e c 2 q 2 j )
Substituting (65) and (66) into the rms' pro t functions and solving the rst order conditions for the rms' optimal quality, we get the equilibrium qualities given in (32). Turning to the asymmetric case and assuming that p = p binds only for e rm 1, rm 2's price reaction functions are again given by (64) and (65). Firm 1's equilibrium price P A 1 (q 1 ;q 2 ) can be calculated by solving 0 = 2(p 1 2q 1 )(p 2 1 + q 3 1 (c + (1 + ρ)c) p 1 q 1 (2 + ρ + e e cq 1 ))q 2 (67) + 1 2 (2p 1 q 1 (2 + ρ + e cq 1 ))q 2 (p 2 1 4p 1 q 1 + q 1 (6 + 2q 1 q 2 (2 + ρ 2 2(c + e c)q 2 + e c 2 q 2 2 )))
for p 1 and using rm 1's second order condition in order to ensure that the solution is in fact a maximizer. Differentiating (67) with respect to q 2 and using the implicit function theorem, we can also calculate ∂P S 1 (q 1 ;q 2 ) ∂q 2 . The equilibrium qualities Q A 1 (ρ) and Q A 2 (ρ) are then obtained by solving the rms' rst order conditions for their optimal qualities numerically.
Finally, considering the symmetric case in which p = e p is binding for both rms, the rms' price reaction functions P RS i (p j ;q i ;q j ) satisfy 0 = 2(p i 2q i )(8p Solving this system of equation numerically and checking the rms' second order conditions, we get the equilibrium prices P S i (q i ;q j ). Furthermore, differentiating (68) with respect to q j and using the implicit function theorem, we can calculate ∂P S i (q i ;q j ) ∂q j which allows us to solve the rms' rst order conditions for their optimal qualities, i.e., 
